Abstract-Tracing IP packets back to their origins is an important step in defending the Internet against denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Two kinds of IP traceback techniques have been proposed as packet marking and packet logging approaches. In packet marking, routers probabilistically write their identification information into the forwarded packets. This approach incurs little overhead but requires a large flow of packets to collect the complete path information. In packet logging, routers record the digests of the forwarded packets. This approach makes it possible to trace even a single packet and hence is considered more powerful. At routers forwarding a large volume of traffic, however, the high storage overhead and access time requirement for recording packet digests introduce practicality problems. In this paper, we present a novel scheme to improve the practicality of log-based IP traceback by reducing its overhead on routers. Our approach makes an intelligent use of packet marking to help improve the scalability of log-based IP traceback. We use mathematical analysis and simulations to evaluate our approach. Our evaluation results show that compared to the state-of-the-art log-based approach called Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE), our approach maintains the ability to trace a single IP packet while reducing the storage overhead by half and the access time overhead by a factor of the number of neighboring routers.
D ENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DoS) attacks have been threatening the utility of the Internet severely [1] . In 2002, a coordinated attack on the Internet name service infrastructure showed the possibility and potential impact of such dedicated attacks [2] . More recently, it was reported that DoS attacks have been used as a means of extortion and have become the subject of lawsuits [3] . Defending against DoS attacks requires not only measures for mitigating the effects of the attacks but also mechanisms for identifying the entities accountable for such attacks. DoS attacks can be classified into flooding attacks and software exploits [4] . Flooding attacks work by flooding a victim with large amounts of packets, while software exploits attack a victim by sending as few as a single packet. Note that software exploits cover a wide spectrum of attacks where the attacker can use the weaknesses of a service running on a victim machine or can exploit vulnerabilities emerging from the semantics of a networking protocol, e.g., TCP's vulnerability to connection reset attacks. In addition, an attacker can place an arbitrary IP address into the source address field of an IP packet (known as IP spoofing) to hide the attack origin. IP spoofing makes it harder to defend against DoS attacks.
Tracing the paths of IP packets back to their origin, known as IP traceback, is an important step in defending against DoS attacks employing IP spoofing. IP traceback facilitates holding attackers accountable and improving the efficacy of mitigation measures. Most of the recently publicized attack incidents have been flooding-based DoS attacks. Accordingly, most of the work in IP traceback has focused on building efficient approaches to trace back flooding-based DoS attacks (see Section 2.4). On the other hand, an IP packet is the smallest unit of communication in the Internet. The existence of protocols/services that are vulnerable to packet injection attacks necessitates an ability to trace a single packet back to its origin. Therefore, it is desirable for an IP traceback approach to be able to trace the path of a single IP packet. Single-packet traceability helps in identifying the origin of both flooding-and softwareexploit-based DoS attacks.
The existing approaches for IP traceback can be grouped into two orthogonal dimensions: packet marking [5] and packet logging [6] . The main idea behind packet marking is to record network path information in packets. In markbased IP traceback, routers write their identification information (e.g., IP addresses) into a header field (hereinafter termed "marking field") of forwarded packets. The destination node then retrieves the marking information from the received packets and determines the network path. Due to the limited space of the marking field, routers probabilistically decide to mark packets so that each marked packet carries only a partial path information. The network path can be constructed by combining the marking information collected from a number of received packets. This approach is also known as probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [7] . PPM incurs little overhead at routers. However, it requires a flow of marked packets to construct the network path toward their origin.
The basic idea in packet logging is to record the path information at routers. In log-based IP traceback, packets are logged by the routers on the path toward the destination. The network path is then derived based on the logged information at the routers. Compared to markbased IP traceback, the log-based approach is more powerful as it can trace attacks that use a single packet, i.e., software exploit attacks, along with flooding attacks [8] . Historically, packet logging was thought impractical due to the enormous storage space required for packet logs. Snoeren et al. [9] proposed a hash-based IP traceback approach, called Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE), to realize log-based IP traceback in practice. Their approach reduces the storage overhead significantly through recording packet digests in a space-efficient data structure, a Bloom filter [10] . SPIE has made a significant improvement on the practicality of log-based IP traceback. However, its deployment at high-speed networks has still been a challenging task due to the high storage overhead and access time requirement for recording packet digests. Considering the effectiveness of log-based IP traceback in tracing both flooding and software exploit attacks, there is a need to develop more scalable solutions to facilitate its deployment at high-speed networks.
In this paper, we present a novel hybrid IP traceback approach based on both packet logging and packet marking. Our main design goal is to maintain the singlepacket traceback ability of the hash-based approach and, at the same time, alleviate the storage overhead and access time requirement for recording packet digests at routers. From this perspective, the main contribution of our work is to improve the practicability of single-packet IP traceback by decreasing its overhead. This paper builds on our previous work published as a conference paper [11] . In the current version, we extend the basic idea to design a complete system and provide a detailed discussion on various architectural and operational components. We also significantly extend the scope of the performance analysis and conduct simulations to back up our analytic results.
The key idea of our approach is to record network path information partially at routers and partially in packets. While a packet is traversing the network, the most recent portion of the network path is recorded in the packet, and the upstream portion of the path is recorded at some intermediate routers. In our approach, depending on the availability of free space in the marking field of the forwarded packets, routers decide where to record network path information. If there is free space available in the marking field, routers write their identification information into the packets; otherwise, routers compute and record the packet digests (the path information stored in the marking field is also encoded into the digests) and then clear the marking field. Based on this idea, we develop a concrete single-packet IP traceback approach. Compared to SPIE, our approach 1) reduces the storage overhead of packet digests to 1/2 and 2) reduces the access time requirement for recording packet digests by a factor of 2n, where n stands for the number of neighboring routers.
We evaluate our approach by comparing it to the existing single-packet traceback and hybrid traceback approaches. For the former comparisons, we use both analysis and experimentation. For the analytical part, we develop a mathematical model to show the packet logging overhead and traceback process overhead. We also study the traceback accuracy by mathematically formulating the false-positive rate and discuss potential ways to compensate for inaccuracies. For the experimental part, we use simulations to supplement our analysis in measuring the storage, access time, and traceback overhead. For the hybrid IP traceback comparisons, we use analysis to compare our approach with two recently proposed hybrid traceback approaches [12] , based on their capabilities and overhead. Our evaluation results indicate the superiority of our approach over the existing approaches in both categories.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the background information and related work. Section 3 describes our IP traceback approach in detail. Section 4 evaluates the performance of our approach through mathematical analysis and simulation. Section 5 discusses deployment issues. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the paper.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Background
In this paper, we refer to a router with high-speed links as a high-speed router. We also term a packet of interest an attack packet. Similarly, the source and destination of an attack packet is an attacker and a victim, respectively. The sequence of routers traversed by an attack packet on its way from the source to the destination makes up an attack path. The attack path from the attacker to the victim is represented as an ordered list of routers ðR 1 ; R 2 ; . . . ; R m Þ. The objective of IP traceback is to figure out this ordered list of routers. The process of constructing attack paths is called a traceback process.
Based on the vulnerability that is exploited, DoS attacks can be classified into flooding attacks and software exploits [4] . Flooding attacks (e.g., smurf and SYN flood) work by flooding victims with large amounts of traffic. Flooding attacks consume some limited resource (e.g., link bandwidth or computing resource) at victims to prevent legitimate users from accessing that resource. Software exploits (e.g., teardrop and ping of death) work by sending victims a single or a few malformed packets to abuse some feature or implementation bug of operating systems or applications to disable the service.
Reckoning with the current Internet environment, we prefer an IP traceback approach with the following features: 
Hash-Based IP Traceback (SPIE)
In SPIE, routers compute and store digests for each forwarded packet. Packet digests are stored into a timestamped digest table that is implemented with a spaceefficient data structure, a Bloom filter [10] . When it has become saturated, the digest table is swapped out for an empty table and is archived for some period of time for a potential traceback process. 1 Each digest table is annotated with the time interval that the table covers and the hash functions used for computing packet digests during that interval.
A traceback server (or multiple servers in hierarchy) equipped with network topology information is responsible for conducting the traceback process. The traceback server constructs the attack path by querying routers hop by hop, starting from the last-hop router (the router next to the victim) toward the source. 2 In each step, based on the responses from the routers, the traceback server identifies one router on the attack path and decides the neighboring routers to be queried in the next step. The traceback server queries routers by sending query messages including the attack packet and the time when the attack packet arrived at the downstream router on the attack path (for the last-hop router, it is the time when the victim received the attack packet). The router being queried computes the packet digest and examines local digest tables of the relevant time period. If the packet digest is found in a digest table, the router is considered to be on the attack path, and the packet arriving time is estimated as the latest possible time in the time interval covered by the digest table. Fig. 1 illustrates the hash-based IP traceback process. SPIE has the following advantages. First, it can determine the network path of a single packet. Second, it is robust against attacks. In SPIE, the network path information is stored at routers in the form of packet digests. It is not easy to compromise routers to garble packet digests or to induce routers to produce specific digests. Third, SPIE does not interfere with the current version of the IP protocol and can trace packets undergoing transformation. Last, SPIE appeals to ISPs. In SPIE, the traceback process is requested by end hosts and accomplished by ISPs who can offer IP traceback as a revenue-generating service.
The increasing amount of traffic load at the backbone networks introduces practicality problems for SPIE. First, a huge amount of memory is required to store packet digests at high-speed routers. The high storage requirement limits the time duration for which packet digests can be kept at routers and, therefore, the window of time in which attack packets can be traced successfully. Second, packet digests must be recorded into digest tables at a rate commensurate with the packet arriving rate. In practice, the access time requirement places limits on the memory type of digest tables. High-speed routers require SRAM digest tables, which are 8 to 16 times more expensive than DRAM. The current technology limits the size of an SRAM digest table to be smaller than that of a DRAM table. Hence, an SRAM digest table records a shorter time period of traffic. This implies that high-speed routers may need to examine more digest tables to check whether it has forwarded an attack packet within an indicated time period. The more digest tables examined, the greater the possibility to get falsepositive results.
Probabilistic Packet Marking
Compared to SPIE, the PPM approach has been studied widely [7] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] . In PPM, a router marks packets with its identification information as they pass through that router. The marking value overloads a rarely used field in the IP header, i.e., the 16-bit IP identification field. Since the marking field is too small to record the entire path, routers mark packets with a probability so that each marked packet carries partial path information. The whole network path can be constructed by combining a number of such packets.
PPM does not incur any storage overhead at routers, and the marking procedure (a write and checksum update) can be easily executed at current routers. However, due to its probabilistic nature, the PPM approach inherently needs multiple packets originated from an attacker to construct the attack path. For example, the current state-of-the-art PPM approach, FIT, requires tens of packets to identify an attack path with high probability [18] . This feature renders PPM approaches suitable for tracing flooding DoS attacks only. Furthermore, due to probabilistic marking, attack packets may arrive at victims without having been marked by any of the intermediate routers. Wily attackers can confuse the victim by sending packets with carefully forged marking values to mislead the traceback process. Because the IP identification field designated for IP fragmentation is reused for marking information, the PPM approach collides with fragmented IP traffic. When a packet undergoes a transformation (e.g., tunneling), the marking information in 1 . Depending on the implementation, the archived digest tables may be stored at local routers [9] or transferred to remote traceback servers [13] .
2. In the case that digest tables are archived at traceback servers, the traceback server examines the digest tables from different routers in the order as if the tables were archived at routers. the packet header will be lost. Finally, in PPM approaches, it is the end systems that use the collected marks to build an attack path. Hence, it is difficult for ISPs to come up with a business model to sell PPM-based IP traceback as a valueadded service to their customers [19] .
Related Work
Most existing work on IP traceback is in the direction of PPM [7] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] . These studies can be characterized as improvements on the scalability and efficiency of mark-based IP traceback. On the other hand, the amount of the literature on single-packet IP traceback has surprisingly been limited. From this perspective, the work presented in this paper makes an important contribution to improve the state of the art in single-packet IP traceback.
Lee et al. [20] presented an approach to reduce the overhead of the hash-based approach. They proposed to digest packet aggregation units (packet flows or sourcedestination sets) instead of individual packets. Recording the digests of packet aggregation units reduces the digest table storage (DTS) overhead. However, tracing an individual packet is accomplished by tracing the packet aggregation to which the packet belongs. Moreover, depending on the implementation, either the writing or reading rate of the digest table should be commensurate with the packet arriving rate. Thus, this approach does not alleviate the access time requirement.
Li et al. [21] proposed probabilistic packet logging where routers probabilistically select a small percentage of forwarded packets to record their digests. This method reduces both the storage overhead and access time requirement for recording packet digests at routers. However, the trade-off is the loss of the ability to trace individual packets since the probability that all routers on an attack path record a specific packet is tiny.
Recently, Al-Duwairi and Manimaran [12] proposed two hybrid IP traceback approaches: distributed link-list traceback (DLLT) and probabilistic pipelined packet marking (PPPM). The main design goal in these approaches is to reduce the number of packets required for constructing attack paths in the PPM approach through utilizing packet logging. In comparison, our work is to make use of packet marking to reduce the overhead of log-based IP traceback in tracing a single packet.
The basic idea in both DLLT and PPPM approaches is to preserve the marking information carried by the packet before marking a packet. When a router probabilistically decides to mark a packet, the router records the marking value carried by the packet before writing a new value into the packet. In DLLT, the preserved marking information is stored at routers, and victims query routers during the traceback process. In PPPM, routers transfer those marking information to the original destinations via writing them into other packets to the same destinations. Given the common hybrid feature in both our work and the work in [12] , we compare these two approaches with our approach in detail in Section 4.2.
HYBRID SINGLE-PACKET IP TRACEBACK
In this paper, we propose a hybrid single-packet IP traceback approach based on both packet marking and logging. Our approach remains the same single-packet traceback capability as SPIE but incurs less overhead at routers through utilizing packet marking. Our approach has a similar architecture as SPIE. In this architecture, routers create audit trails on network traffic, and traceback servers construct attack paths through examining those audit trails. The differences are in audit trails, as well as the approach to creating and examining audit trails.
Main Idea
In hybrid single-packet IP traceback, each tracebackenabled router could commit both packet marking and packet logging operations. The marking operation on a packet is to append router identification information into the marking field of the packet. The logging operation on a packet is to compute and record the packet digest. When forwarding a packet, routers decide to mark or log the packet depending on whether there is free space available in the marking field of the packet. If so, routers mark the packet; otherwise, routers log the packet and clear the marking field.
Suppose that the identification information of k routers can fit into the marking field of one packet. When a router logs a packet, the marking value carried by the packet, which indicates the k routers that the packet has traversed most recently, is also encoded into the packet digest. In this way, logging a packet at a router records not only the current router but also the k upstream routers on the network path. While a packet is traversing the network, logging the packet at every ðk þ 1Þth router is enough to record the complete network path. During the traceback process, the attack path is constructed one portion by one portion. The marking value of the attack packet received by a victim indicates the most recent portion ( k routers) of the attack path. Furthermore, querying the router that has logged the attack packet identifies an upstream portion (k þ 1 routers) of the path. We depict the main idea of hybrid single-packet IP traceback with an example in Fig. 2 .
In hybrid single-packet IP traceback, packets are logged at every ðk þ 1Þth router enroute from the source to the destination. Reckoning with the network traffic, 1=ðk þ 1Þ of the packets forwarded by a router on the average need to be logged at that router. Compared to SPIE, the storage overhead and access time requirement for recording packet digests are decreased by a factor of k þ 1. In addition, the packets arriving at a router can be categorized based on their marking values and recorded into different digest tables simultaneously. That reduces the access time requirement further.
Based on the above-mentioned idea and current Internet environment, we consider a basic case of hybrid singlepacket IP traceback and develop a concrete IP traceback approach termed as Hybrid IP Traceback (HIT). In HIT, the marking field of a packet accommodates the identification information of a single router. While a packet is traversing the network, the routers on the path mark the packet deterministically but log the packet alternately. Note that a more carefully designed marking approach could be used to increase the interlogging distance between routers (i.e., have more than one consecutive routers to mark a packet). However, in this paper, we only consider the simplest case to serve as a proof of-concept. In the following, we present HIT from the below aspects:
1. Router operation: how should packets be marked with the complete identification information of a router and how should packet digests be computed? 2. Digest table: how should packet digests be categorized so as to record them into different digest tables simultaneously? 3. Traceback process: how should the marking information encoded into packet digests be decrypted? 4. Compatibility and transformation: how should backward compatibility be achieved and how should packets undergoing transformation be traced?
Router Operation
In HIT, each traceback-enabled router is assigned a 15-bit ID number. ID numbers are used to differentiate neighboring routers of a router. Thus, the same ID number can be assigned to any two routers as long as they do not have a common neighbor. Muthuprasanna et al. [22] study the unique ID number assignment problem for Internet routers. Based on an analysis on several Internet topology measurement data sets, they report that a 12-bit ID field is sufficient for a unique ID number assignment within a two-hop neighborhood. Therefore, 15-bit IDs are more than enough for assigning a unique ID number to all neighboring routers of each router within a network. Like most PPM approaches, the marking values are encoded in the 16-bit identification field of the IP header. The leftmost bit is termed the logging flag bit. It is set to 1 if the current router commits a logging operation on the packet; otherwise, it is set to 0. The remaining 15 bits are used to store a router ID number. Fig. 3a depicts the encoding scheme.
HIT computes packet digests in a similar way as in SPIE. A router uses an appropriate-length prefix of the IP packet as input to digest functions. In SPIE, the packet prefix is the 20-byte IP header excluding three variant fields (TOS, TTL, and checksum) plus the first 8 bytes of the payload. HIT uses almost the same packet prefix except that the logging flag bit is also excluded. Fig. 3b shows the packet prefixes used in the two approaches.
In this encoding, the ID number of upstream routers is encoded into packet digests. If a packet is logged at a router, the fact that the packet digest is stored at the router indicates that the router is on the network path. Moreover, the packet digest includes the information of the upstream router on the network path. Therefore, the logging operation on a packet records the current and the upstream routers on the path.
When forwarding a packet p, the router decides its operation on p depending on the value of p's logging flag bit. If the logging flag is 0 (the upstream router did not log p), the router chooses to commit both logging and marking operations; if the logging flag is 1 (the upstream router logged p), the router chooses to commit only a marking operation.
When a packet transfers from a sender host to the first router on its network path, the logging flag is unset and therefore meaningless. The first router on the path needs additional mechanisms to decide its operation. We propose two improvements to the above-mentioned algorithm. The first one is optional, and the second one is compulsory:
1. If an input port of a router is connected with only end hosts, we upgrade the input port to a marking input port. The marking input port is assigned an ID number as if the port were a neighbor of its router. When a packet arrives at the marking input port, the port marks the packet with its ID number and resets the logging flag. 2. Each router maintains a neighbor list. This list includes the ID numbers of its neighboring routers and marking input ports. For a given router R, if the router ID number i carried by a packet equals to an entry of the neighbor list at R, then i is regarded as valid at R. When forwarding a packet p, the router first checks whether the router ID number i carried by p is valid. If i is valid, the router makes a decision based on the logging flag in p. If i is not valid, that means that p comes directly from the sender host or an attacker that sends packets with forged marking values. In this case, the router chooses to commit only a marking operation. Fig. 4 describes the full algorithm.
While a packet traverses the network, the routers on the path mark the packet deterministically but log it alternately. Depending on the setup of the router and the arriving port, the packet may or may not be logged at the first router on the path. The reason of deterministic marking is to facilitate the traceback process (see Section 3.4).
Digest Table
Similar to SPIE, HIT stores packet digests in digest tables that are implemented with Bloom filters. However, in the HIT approach, routers may maintain multiple digest tables to record multiple packet digests at the same time. Each digest table is associated with one or more router ID numbers. The digest of a packet is stored into a digest table only if the digest table is associated with the router ID number carried by the packet.
In particular, a router may maintain a different digest table for each of its neighboring routers. That is, each digest table is associated with the ID number of one neighboring router. When the router decides to log a packet, it examines the router ID number carried by the packet and then stores the packet digest into the corresponding digest table. In this way, packets coming from different neighboring routers can be digested and recorded into different digest tables simultaneously as long as each table has its own read/write hardware. Hence, the digest table access time is not required to be commensurate with the overall packet arriving rate but with the maximum packet arriving rate from different neighboring routers.
At a low-speed router where the overall packet arriving rate is not higher than the cycle time of DRAM, the access time of a digest table is not a concern. The low-speed router has another option to maintain one DRAM digest table that is associated with the ID numbers of all its neighboring routers. Packets coming from all the neighboring routers are digested and recorded into the same digest table. Fig. 5 illustrates the two extreme cases of the organization of digest tables.
After storing a certain number of packet digests that are dependent on its configuration, a digest table is regarded as saturated. When it has become saturated, digest tables are paged out and archived for some period of time. The length of the time period depends on the resource constraints of routers and the requirements of the IP traceback scheme. In addition, each digest table is annotated with its associated router ID numbers. The storage space for these router ID numbers is negligible.
Traceback Process
Similar to SPIE, the traceback process in HIT is managed by traceback servers equipped with network topology information. However, HIT utilizes the marking information stored in packets and digested at routers to facilitate the traceback process.
The victim under DoS attack dispatches a traceback request to the traceback server, providing an attack packet and the time of receiving the attack packet. Given a victim and an attack packet, the traceback server can pinpoint the last-hop router based on the location of the victim and the router ID number carried by the packet. From the value of the logging flag bit in the packet, the traceback server can further determine whether the last-hop router logged the packet. If the last-hop router logged the packet, the traceback server queries that router; otherwise, the traceback server dispatches queries to the neighboring routers of the last-hop router.
When a router receives a query from the traceback server, the router examines all digest tables of the relevant time period for the attack packet. In order to check whether an attack packet is recorded into a digest table, the router embeds the router ID number associated with the digest table into the packet, computes the packet digest, and consults the digest table. If an entry exists for the packet, the current router is believed to be on the attack path, and the router indicated by the router ID number is considered as the upstream router on the attack path. Fig. 6 illustrates the process of checking whether an attack packet is recorded into a digest table.
If a router commits a logging operation on an attack packet, querying that router will find out two routers (i.e., this router and its upstream router) on the attack path. Upon receipt of responses from queried routers, the traceback server determines two routers on the attack path and then dispatches queries to the neighboring routers of the furthest router that has been identified. Fig. 7 illustrates the traceback process in HIT.
Compatibility and Transformation
With some improvements, HIT is able to achieve backward compatibility and trace packets undergoing transformation. The main idea of the improvements is that 1) routers do not mark but log IP fragments, and 2) routers both mark and log packets undergoing transformation.
Besides the ordinary digest tables described in Section 3.3, each router maintains a special digest table, called the fragmentation and transformation digest table (FTDT). FTDT is only for storing the digests of IP fragments and the digests of IP packets that have been transformed at the current router. Packet digests stored in FTDT are computed in the same manner as in SPIE. The approach to managing and examining FTDT is also the same as SPIE.
Each router also maintains a transform lookup table (TLT) corresponding to FTDT. TLT records packet transformation information and is indexed by packet digests. The implementation of TLT is presented in [9] . Given a packet, consulting TLT can find out whether the packet was transformed, and if so, the original packet (or the original packet prefix used for computing the packet digest) can be reconstructed.
The router processes each forwarded packet p as follows:
1. If p is an IP fragment and transformed at the current router, the router records the transformation information into TLT and stores the digest of p into FTDT. 2. If p is an IP fragment and not transformed at the current router, the digest of p is stored into FTDT. 3. If p is a nonfragmented packet and transformed at the current router, the router records the transformation information into TLT, stores the digest of p into FTDT, marks p with its ID number, and sets the logging flag of p to 1. 4. Otherwise, the router follows the algorithm in Fig. 4 . After receiving a query about an attack packet p, the router examines digest tables as follows:
1. If p is an IP fragment, the router examines FTDTs of the relevant time period. 2. Otherwise, the router examines all digest tables (including FTDTs) of the relevant time period. At the same time, the router also consults TLTs for the same time intervals. If p was transformed at the router, the router inverts p to its original form p0. If p0 is a nonfragmented packet, the router can further determine its upstream router and whether the upstream router logged p0 from the marking information in p0.
The traceback server traces an attack packet p as follows:
1. If p is an IP fragment, the traceback process is the same as in SPIE. That is, the traceback server queries routers in a hop-by-hop manner. 2. If p is a nonfragmented packet, the traceback process is similar to the one presented in Section 3.4. The only difference is on querying routers where packet p underwent transformation. To illustrate, if p undergoes transformation at a router R j , R j will log p, no matter whether its upstream router, say, R i , has logged p0, the original form of p. During the traceback process, based on the response from R j , the traceback server can find out the original packet p0, the upstream router R i , and whether R i logged p0 and then takes proper action as follows:
. If p0 is an IP fragment, go to step 1. . Otherwise, if R i logged p0, query R i . . Otherwise, query the neighboring routers of R i . HIT uses the same amount of resources as SPIE in recording the digests of IP fragments and the packet transformation information. We evaluate HIT by comparing it to the state-of-the-art approaches in 1) single-packet and 2) hybrid IP traceback.
Comparison to Single-Packet IP Traceback Approach
We use mathematical analysis and simulation to compare HIT with the original single-packet IP traceback approach, i.e., SPIE [9] . The performance metrics include the following:
Packet logging overhead
. DTS. This is the memory used to store packet digests at a router for a period of time, . Digest table access time requirement (DTA). This is the number of packet digests written into a digest table per unit time.
Traceback process overhead
. The number of queried routers (NR). This is the number of routers queried by the traceback server during the traceback process. . The number of examined digest tables (ND). This is the number of digest tables examined at a queried router during the traceback process.
Traceback accuracy
. The number of false-positive branches (NF). This is the number of spurious branches grafted onto the attack path during the traceback process. From the perspective of ISPs, the packet logging overhead is more crucial than the traceback process overhead and traceback accuracy. Routers keep recording packet digests no matter whether DoS attacks are reported or not. In general, the traceback process is not a frequent operation, and ISPs can charge for traceback processes. Additional mechanisms may be employed to refine traceback results.
Packet Logging Overhead
In HIT, packets logged at a router include 1. IP fragments and 2. nonfragmented packets that need to be logged at the router, which include 2.1. nonfragmented packets that have not been logged at the upstream routers and 2.2. nonfragmented packets logged at the upstream routers and transformed at the current router. Let us consider all packets forwarded by a router. We use P l to denote the percentage of packets that need to be logged at the router. We also assume that the percentage of IP fragments is , and the percentage of IP packets undergoing transformation at the router is . Furthermore, let us consider all nonfragmented packets forwarded by a router. We use Y to denote the percentage of packets that need to be logged at the router out of the nonfragmented packets. Then, the percentages of different types of IP packets in all packets forwarded by a router can be expressed as in Table 1 .
IP packets to be logged at a router include the packets of types 1 and 2, as listed in Table 1 . Thus, we have
Expressing Y in terms of P l , we have
Type 2 includes 2.1 and 2.2; thus, we have
We use (2) to substitute for Y in (3). The result is
Because 0 1 and 0 1, we know that 0 1 and 0 À 1. Applying these inequalities to (4) yields
Measurement studies show that 0:25 percent [23] and 3 percent [24] . Thus, we have 0:50 P l 0:51:
That means, in HIT, about 50 percent of the packets forwarded by a router need to be logged at that router. In SPIE, all packets forwarded by a router need to be logged. Therefore, the DTS and access time requirement in HIT are roughly 1/2 of those in SPIE. Let DT S y and DT S a denote the DTS in HIT and in SPIE, respectively. Then,
In addition, in HIT, a router can keep a separate digest table for each neighboring router, and packets coming from different neighboring routers can be recorded in corresponding digest tables in parallel. Hence, the digest table access rate can be reduced further by a factor of the number of neighboring routers. Suppose a router has n neighboring routers. In the best case, the traffic arrives at the router equally from each of its neighbors. Then, where DT A y and DT A a represent the DTA in the HIT and SPIE, respectively. In the worst case, all arriving traffic is from one neighbor. Then,
Traceback Process Overhead
During the traceback process, the traceback server queries routers in the network, and routers being queried examine local digest tables. NR reflects the overhead on the traceback server, and ND reflects the overhead on the queried routers. For a given attack path ðR 1 ; R 2 ; . . . ; R m Þ, the traceback process is to construct the attack path backward, from R m to R 1 , through iteratively querying the neighboring routers of the furthest router that has been identified. In HIT, a packet traversing the network is generally logged at every other router on the path. Suppose router R i on the attack path logged the attack packet. Querying router R i can identify two routers on the attack path, namely, R i and R iÀ1 . Suppose an attack path has h hops, and each router on the attack path has n neighboring routers on the average. During the traceback process, the traceback server needs to dispatch h=2 rounds of queries, querying n À 1 routers in each round (excluding the downstream router on the attack path), totally ðn À 1Þ Â h=2 routers.
In SPIE, a packet traversing the network is logged at every router on the network path, and querying a router on the attack path can only identify that router itself. With the same assumption as above, during the traceback process, the traceback server needs to dispatch h rounds of queries, querying n À 1 routers in each round, totally ðn À 1Þ Â h routers. Using NR y and NR a to denote the number of routers queried during the traceback process in HIT and in SPIE, respectively, we have
The traceback server queries routers through sending query messages. The query message includes an attack packet p and the time t when the attack packet arrived at the downstream router on the attack path. Based on time t and the transmission delay between routers, the queried router is supposed to infer the time when packet p was digested at the current router and then examine relevant digest tables. However, because of timing uncertainties (e.g., varying transmission delay and time asynchronization between routers), the queried router can only estimate a query time period Át that covers the time when the packet was digested. The router then examines all cached digest tables whose time intervals overlap Át.
If the size of a digest table is s bits and its memory efficiency factor 3 is set to be r, that digest table can store s Â r packet digests. Suppose the number of packet digests written into the digest table per unit time is u; then, the time interval covered by the digest table can be computed as
In general, the time interval covered by a digest table in HIT is longer than that in SPIE due to the following reasons:
1. HIT stores fewer packet digests at routers. In HIT, routers need to log roughly 1/2 of the forwarded packets, while SPIE requires routers to log every forwarded packet. 2. HIT distributes packet digests into multiple digest tables. In HIT, the router maintains a different digest 
where u y and u a denote the average packet digest writing rate of digest tables in HIT and in SPIE, respectively. Let s y and s a be the digest table size in HIT and in SPIE, respectively. We assume the ratio of the digest table size in HIT to that in SPIE is c ðc ! 1Þ. Thus, we obtain
We apply (12) and (13) to (11) . Then, the relationship between the average time intervals covered by digest tables in both approaches can be expressed as
where t y and t a denote the average time interval covered by a digest table in HIT and in SPIE, respectively. At a given time, there are n digest tables recording traffic in HIT, whereas there is only one in SPIE. For a query time period Át, let ND y and ND a denote the average number of digest tables being examined in HIT and SPIE, respectively. We can write 
That means the number of digest tables being examined is dependent on the time interval covered by digest tables. At high-speed routers where digest tables store short periods of traffic data, HIT examines fewer digest tables than SPIE. Furthermore, at other routers, SPIE performs better.
Traceback Accuracy
A Bloom filter is a space-efficient data structure to represent a set and check for the membership of an element in the set. When checking membership, Bloom filters never yield a false negative but may produce false positives. The falsepositive rate of a Bloom filter is dependent on the size of the Bloom filter and the size of the set stored. Suppose a Bloom filter is of s bits and stores e elements, the false-positive rate is exponentially dependent on the value of e=s [25] , which is called the memory efficiency factor [9] . Hence, the falsepositive rate of a Bloom filter can be controlled by carefully choosing its memory efficiency factor. If a router examines d digest tables for a packet digest and the false-positive rate of each table is f, then the probability to get false-positive results is
During the traceback process, queried routers may return false-positive responses, introducing spurious branches arising from the attack path. We refer to those spurious branches as false-positive branches (FPBs). In HIT, FPBs may be generated in two cases, as illustrated in Fig. 8 . One case is that FPBs arise from logging routers; the other case is that FPBs arise from marking routers. Suppose, in Fig. 8 , router R 8 is the furthest router that has been identified so far on the attack path. R 8 did not log but marked the attack packet. The traceback server queries the neighboring routers of R 8 :
1. The queried router is on the attack path (e.g., R 5 ).
The router logged the attack packet. For each neighbor in turn, the router embeds the ID number of that router into the attack packet, computes the packet digest, and examines relevant digest tables. The false-positive results of examining those tables will graft that neighbor router (e.g., R 2 ) onto the attack path, introducing an FPB. 2. The queried router is not on the attack path (e.g., R 6 ).
The false positives resulting from examining the digest tables at the router will graft that router itself onto the attack path, introducing an FPB. Suppose, on the average, each router in the network has n neighboring routers and examines ND y digest tables when being queried. In case 1 above, the probability of an FPB is
In case 2 above, the probability of an FPB is
Consider the scenario where the traceback server queries the neighboring routers of a router, say, R j , on the attack path. The traceback server queries a total of n À 1 routers. Among them, one router is the upstream router on the attack path, say, R i ; the other n À 2 routers are not on the attack path. R i examines the digest tables to check which one of its n À 1 neighbors is on the attack path. Let random variables A and B represent the number of FPBs generated when querying R i and the other n À 2 routers, respectively. Both A and B follow the binomial distribution. A is with parameters n À 2 and P b 1 , and B is with parameters n À 2 and P b2 .
In HIT, a packet traversing the network is generally logged at every other router on the path. Let NF y denote the average number of FPBs generated during the traceback process in HIT. For a given attack path of h hops, we have
If we assume that each router ensures that P b 2 q, because P b 1 P b 2 , then we can get an upper bound on NF y as
In SPIE, FPBs may be generated only when querying routers not on the attack path. Suppose, on the average, each router has n neighbors and examines ND a digest tables when queried. Then, the probability of an FPB is
Let NF a denote the average number of FPBs generated during the traceback process in SPIE. Since a packet traversing the network is logged at every router on the path, for a given attack path of h hops, we have
Suppose each router ensures that P b 0 q; then, we can get the same upper bound on NF a as in NF y : If each queried router could limit the possibility of reporting FPBs by the same value in both HIT and SPIE, these two approaches will have the same upper bound on the average number of FPBs.
FPBs result in inaccurate traceback results. However, some mechanisms may be used to prune FPBs, thereby compensating for the inaccuracy to some extent. One is to stick with the longest path and remove other shorter branches. Another is to utilize routing information to detect and prune FPBs. For example, if a router R i is considered to have forwarded the attack packet to another router R j , we should be able to find the corresponding entry (i.e., the packets destined to the victim will be forwarded to R j ) in the routing table at R i .
Simulations
We conduct simulations to supplement some of the analytic results. We focus on packet logging overhead and traceback process overhead characteristics.
For the packet logging overhead, we design simulations to study the probability that packets are logged at routers in HIT. The simulations are based on two network topologies: The first one is a synthetic transit-stub topology with one transit and 48 stub networks. The transit network includes 16 nodes, which we refer to as core routers. The overall topology has 256 nodes and 353 links. The second topology is AT&T POPlevel topology collected by Rocketfuel [26] , which includes 115 nodes and 148 links. Nineteen out of 115 nodes have more than two neighbors. We refer to these 19 nodes as core routers.
We conduct simulations on Network Simulator (ns-2) [27] . We assume that each router is connected directly with an end host. Each end host sends a packet to all other hosts. None of the packets are fragmented or transformed while traversing the network. In the simulations, we consider two scenarios. In scenario 1, all packets are logged at the first router on their paths; in scenario 2, all packets are not logged at the first router on their paths. For each scenario, we collect the number of packets logged and the number of packets forwarded by each router, calculate the probability that packets are logged at each router, and compute the cumulative distribution function of those logging probabilities.
Figs. 9 and 10 show the results on the transit-stub topology, in scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. In both scenarios, the logging probabilities at core routers fall in the range of 45 percent to 55 percent. When considering the logging probabilities at all routers, we notice that the logging probabilities vary remarkably in different scenarios. In scenario 1, around 30 percent routers has a logging probability less than 50 percent; in scenario 2, around 70 percent routers has a logging probability less than 50 percent. This is because the logging probabilities at the routers at or near the network edge depend significantly on whether the first router on the path logs packets or not. Consider router R 1 in Fig. 11 . All traffic through R 1 is originated from or destined to H 1 . In scenario 1, all ingress packets are logged at R 1 , and generally half of the egress packets are logged at R 1 . This results in a logging probability of about 75 percent. In scenario 2, only around half of the egress packets are logged at R 1 , resulting in a logging probability of about 25 percent. A complementary situation applies to router R 2 in Fig. 11 . Most traffic through R 2 is originated from or destined to end hosts 2 hops away (i.e., H 3 ; H 4 ; . . . ; H n ). In scenario 1, only a small portion of the ingress packets and around half of the egress packets are logged at R 2 , resulting in a low logging probability. In scenario 2, most of the ingress packets, around half of the egress packets, and all packets between the hosts of H 3 ; H 4 ; . . . ; H n are logged at R 2 , resulting in a high logging probability.
Figs. 12 and 13 show the results on AT&T topology, in scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. In scenario 1, around 75 percent of core routers and 15 percent of all routers have a logging probability less than 50 percent. In scenario 2, around 25 percent of core routers and 85 percent of all routers have a logging probability less than 50 percent. We think the reason is the topology of the AT&T's network. AT&T's network topology includes hubs in major cities and spokes that fan out to smaller cities. These hubs (we call them core routers in the simulations) are like router R 2 in Fig. 11 , and the spokes are like router R 1 in Fig. 11 . That Fig. 9 . The cumulative distribution function of logging probability (transitstub topology, packets are logged at the first router on the path). Fig. 10 . The cumulative distribution function of logging probability (transit-stub topology, packets are not logged at the first router on the path). Fig. 11 . Routers at or near the edge of network.
explains why the hubs and spokes have logging probabilities that are kind of complementary to each other.
The simulation results demonstrate that 45 percent to 55 percent of forwarded packets need to be logged at the backbone routers of a network. This confirms the analytic results of the DTS and access time overhead. The simulation results also show that at the routers at or near the edge of a network, the percentage of packets that need to be logged depends on whether the first router on the network path logs packets or not. ISPs may attain better performance through properly setting up the behavior of the edge routers.
For the traceback process overhead, we simulate the number of routers being queried during the process of tracing an attack path of various lengths. The degree of each router on the path is determined randomly according to the degree distribution of a router-level topology from CAIDA (ITDK0304 skitter data) [28] . We conduct 1,000 test runs for each path length. The simulation results in Fig. 14 show that HIT queries around half as many routers as SPIE.
Comparison to Hybrid IP Traceback Approaches
In this section, we compare HIT with DLLT and PPPM approaches [12] based on several performance metrics.
Number of Packets Required for Traceback
HIT needs only one packet to construct an attack path. In general, both DLLT and PPPM need multiple packets to construct an attack path. The number of packets depends on the marking probability q at routers and the length of the attack path. In an extreme case where q ¼ 1, DLLT can trace a single packet.
Marking Overhead on Packets
The IP header does not have a field provisioned for storing packet marking information. It is widely accepted in PPM approaches to overload the 16-bit IP identification field with the price of backward incompatibility with fragmented IP traffic [7] . Although the 13-bit fragment offset field becomes meaningless when the IP identification field is overloaded, it is a challenging task to overload the fragment offset field. Since receivers regard the IP packets with nonzero fragment offset values as IP fragments [29] , overloading the fragment offset field will collide with all the IP traffic in the Internet, both nonfragmented and fragmented. Additional mechanisms must be in place when the fragment offset field is reused for packet marking [19] . In HIT, the marking value is stored in the 16-bit IP identification field. As mentioned in Section 3.5, HIT does not mark IP fragments and thereby is backward compatible. In DLLT, the size of the marking field is 34 bits, and in PPPM, it is 57 bits.
Storage Overhead
In HIT and DLLT, when logging a packet, the router records both the packet digest and the marking information carried by the packet for a potential traceback process. Hence, in HIT and DLLT, the storage overhead at a router is proportionally dependent on 1) the logging probability (the percentage of the packets logged at the router), 2) the total incoming link capacity, and 3) the time period for which the packet logging information are kept at the router.
In both approaches, packet digests are stored into the digest table implemented with a Bloom filter. The difference is in the storage of the marking information. In HIT, the marking information is encoded into the packet digest and does not incur additional storage overhead; while in DLLT, the 34-bit marking information is stored into a separate marking information table (MIT). For a digest table of s bits, the corresponding MIT table is of 34 Â s bits. If we assume that both approaches maintain digest tables of the same size and of the same memory efficiency factor r, the storage overhead for DLLT is 34 times higher than that for HIT.
We consider a router with a total link capacity of b packets per unit time and with a memory efficiency factor of a digest table r. As shown in Section 4, the logging probability in HIT P l is around 50 percent on the average. In DLLT, the logging probability is the same as the marking probability, so we use q to represent both probabilities in DLLT. Let S h and S d denote Fig. 12 . The cumulative distribution function of logging probability (AT&T topology, packets are logged at the first router on the path). Fig. 13 . The cumulative distribution function of logging probability (AT&T topology, packets are not logged at the first router on the path). the storage overhead per unit time in the HIT and DLLT approaches, respectively. We can write
When q > 
If we use r ¼ 0:2 (from [9] ), the relation between S h and S d becomes S d > S h for q > 0:064. In PPPM, routers store the marking information in a per-destination buffer. Routers also employ a Bloom filter to improve the lookup speed of the marking buffer. Thus, the storage overhead at a router is fixed, and it includes the Bloom filter and a storage space of size 57 Â 2 32 bits for the marking buffer. The authors in [12] make an observation that the number of destinations seen by a router during a small window of time is limited. They use this observation to reduce the size of the marking buffer from 2 32 entries to 2 a entries, where a represents the size of the IP destination address suffix used to index the buffer. Under this assumption, which may cause traceback inaccuracies due to possible suffix collisions, the storage overhead of PPPM is given by the sum of the storage space for a Bloom filter s and the storage space of size 57 Â 2 a bits for the marking buffer.
Router Processing Overhead
IP traceback schemes introduce processing overhead onto the routers in two phases: 1) while creating audit trails on network traffic and 2) while conducting traceback to find out an attack path. During peacetime, routers spend processing power for the first phase, and during an attack, they spend processing power for the second phase. Recall that packet marking is inexpensive as it can be done in hardware. On the other hand, packet logging incurs more processing overhead on the routers. First, we compare the three approaches based on the average overhead per router during the first phase. In HIT, a router marks 100 percent and logs 50 percent of the traffic. In both DLLT and PPPM, the percentage of the traffic being marked and logged at a router is indicated by the marking/logging probability q, with a typical value of q 2 ½0:05; 0:3 [12] .
Next, we compare the three approaches based on the overhead per traceback process. In HIT, the processing overhead depends on 1) the number of routers and 2) number of neighbors of each router on the attack path.
If an attack path has h routers, each of which has n neighbors on the average, the number of routers involved during a traceback operation is given by ðn À 1Þ Â h=2 for HIT. In DLLT, the processing overhead depends on the number of routers on the attack path. Finally, PPPM does not introduce any processing overhead on the routers as the traceback process is conducted locally at the victim. Recall that the additional processing overhead incurred in HIT is required to trace back a single packet, which is not possible in DLLT (unless q ¼ 100 percent ) and PPPM approaches.
DISCUSSION
Deployment
The effectiveness of log-based IP traceback increases greatly with the widespread deployment of traceback-enabled routers in the network. Similar to SPIE, it is likely that hybrid single-packet IP traceback does not require all routers to be traceback enabled. All traceback-enabled routers within a network can be regarded as an overlay network. If the traceback server has the topology knowledge of that overlay network and each traceback-enabled router knows its overlay neighbors, the hybrid approach still works.
Tracing a packet that has traversed multiple autonomous systems (ASs) requires cooperation and trustworthiness among those ASs. Moriarty [30] proposed an inter-AS communication protocol to facilitate the cooperation among ASs during the inter-AS traceback process. Any modification of routers cannot be deployed simultaneously or be finished in a short term throughout the Internet. It is unrealistic to expect all ASs begin to deploy IP traceback services at the same time. The traceback process may halt prematurely because of the lack of support from some AS on the attack path. Korkmaz et al. [31] proposed a scheme for conducting the traceback process under the environment where hash-based IP traceback is partially deployed at the AS level. Because of the similarity between the hash-based approach and the hybrid approach, similar results apply to the effectiveness of the hybrid approach in an AS-level partial deployment scenario.
Security Concerns
Attackers may write a forged marking value into attack packets. This only helps the attacker to prefix a false router to the attack path. Since a packet is marked by each and logged by every other router, the attacker cannot introduce an arbitrary attack path. In order to successfully exploit this vulnerability, 1) attackers have to know the ID numbers of the neighboring routers of the first router on the path, and 2) attack packets need to enter the network at a router port that is not (or cannot be) upgraded to mark packets, as described in Section 3.2. We think that it is not easy to exploit this vulnerability. Even succeeding in that, attackers can prefix at most one router to the attack path. To deal with this vulnerability, the traceback server may refer to routing information for the authenticity of the furthest router on the attack path.
Attackers may flood the victim with IP fragments for the purpose of consuming more storage space and reducing the time duration for which packet digests are kept at routers. At low-speed routers where the storage space is not a concern, routers can dedicate more storage space for the digests of IP fragments. At high-speed routers where the storage space is a concern, attack traffic consumes only a small fraction of the bandwidth. Hence, the increased storage overhead at high-speed routers is trivial compared to the total amount of memory dedicated for packet digests.
CONCLUSION
Tracing a single IP packet back to its origin is the ultimate goal of IP traceback. SPIE illustrates the feasibility of tracing individual packets with packet logging. However, the storage overhead and the access time requirement for recording packet digests are fairly high at high-speed routers. On the other hand, the traceback approach based on packet marking incurs little overhead at routers, although it can only trace large packet flows.
In this paper, we have proposed a hybrid single-packet IP traceback approach based on both packet logging and packet marking. The main idea is to accumulate the information of multiple routers on the network path through packet marking and log these accumulated path information at some of the routers on the path. Based on this idea and the current Internet environment, we have developed a concrete IP traceback approach. Our approach has the same single-packet traceback ability as SPIE but incurs less overhead at routers. Specifically, our approach 1) reduces the storage overhead to 1/2 and 2) reduces the access time requirement by a factor of the number of neighboring routers. 
Because fðxÞ ¼ ndxe < nðx þ 1Þ and gðxÞ ¼ dnbxe ! nbx, so fðxÞ gðxÞ. 
